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People v. Barnes-GeorgeOrwell's 1984 Revisited:
Unbridled and Impermissible Police Use of
Computer Power in the Modem Age
Honorable Sam L. Amirante*

I. INTRODUCTION
Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Lord Acton'

It is 1984 and "Big Brother is watching you." ' 2 In his nightmarish
novel published in 1949, George Orwell graphically portrays the evils
and fears of a government with absolute power and control. He
prophesied a time without privacy, when the government sees every
thought, word, and deed.
This type of absolute governmental power is unlikely to ever occur
under our system of checks and balances, as long as the judicial
branch makes certain that the actions of the other two branches are
neither arbitrary and capricious, nor executed randomly with unbridled
discretion by government agencies. 3 Consistent with this traditional
and long-standing principle of separation of powers, Justice Byron
White, writing for the United States Supreme Court in Delaware v.
Prouse,4 prohibited law enforcement officers from making random
traffic stops for the purpose of checking an individual's registration
and driver's license. With this check and balance in place, the year
* Associate Judge, Third Municipal District, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois;
B.S. Loyola University, 1970; J.D. Loyola School of Law, 1974. Special thanks to
Attorney Donna Stolar, my research assistant, and Gerri Greifenstein, my dedicated legal
secretary.
I. FAMOUS QUOTATIONS 521 (John Bartlett ed., 16th ed. 1992).
2. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 3 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1949) (capitalization omitted).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Our
tripartite system of government was set up as a check on the powers of government. See
also Justice Brandeis' dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926),
noting that "[tihe [purpose of] the doctrine of the separation of powers was . . . to
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power [and] to save the people from autocracy." Id.
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
4. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
5. Id. In Prouse, because a patrol officer stopped a vehicle and "was not acting
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1984 came and went without the atrocities of Orwell's novel
materializing.
In 1987, however, the Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court
authored a Machiavellian "ends justify the means" sequel to Orwell's
1984. In People v. Barnes,6 the appellate court allowed Illinois police
officers to run random computer searches of vehicle registration with
total and unbridled discretion. 7 The "Barnes stop," as it is
affectionately referred to by police and prosecutors, is widely used in a
number of northwest Cook County suburbs.' It is used by some
police departments more than others, and by some police officers more
than others. 9 The stop is apparently justified because a vehicle's
license plate number is in "plain view" and is therefore subject to
search by a police officer.' °

pursuant to any standards, guidelines, or procedures pertaining to document spot
checks," the trial court found the stop to be "wholly capricious." Id. at 650-51. The
Supreme Court held that the stop was "unreasonable," and that persons in automobiles
may not "have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of
police officers." Id. at 663 (emphasis added). See also People v. Brand, 390 N.E.2d 65,
67 (III. App. 1st Dist. 1979) (recognizing the Supreme Court's prohibition against
discretionary, random stops of vehicles to check licenses or registrations without
"articulable and reasonable suspicion"); People v. Harr, 235 N.E.2d 1 (111.
App. 2d Dist.
1968) (holding that the search for a driver's license cannot be justified merely by a
police officer's suspicion and without probable cause).
App. 4th Dist. 1987).
6. 505 N.E.2d 427 (111.
7. Id.
8. The Third Municipal District of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois is
comprised of 24 northwest suburban municipalities. All misdemeanor and traffic
violations are adjudicated in a central facility in Rolling Meadows, Illinois. The
overwhelming population of the district is comprised of white, middle to upper-middle
class families. The author of this Article has been assigned to the Third Municipal
District since 1991.
9. The judges in Rolling Meadows are assigned on a rotating calendar, wherein they
preside over traffic and misdemeanor cases from a given municipality for a minimum of
three months. The felony rotation is from six months to one year. The civil rotation is
a minimum of one year. The author has presided over traffic, misdemeanor, felony and
civil cases for virtually all of the municipalities over the last six years.
10. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971), overruled in part,
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (plurality opinion) (overruling the
"inadvertent" requirement of Coolidge). The Coolidge Court recognized that
[w]hat the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer.., had
a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence . . .[but] the 'plain view' doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.
Id. at 466 (emphasis added). But see People v. Ervin, 621 N.E.2d 1061 (II1. App. 1st
Dist. 1991) ("The license plate was in plain view. Thus there was no search when the
officer viewed the plate and then conducted a computer check.") (emphasis added).
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Is a "Barnes stop" consistent with the proscriptions of Delawarev.
Prouse? Is there a difference between a random stop and a random
computer search? Is there an expectation of privacy in vehicle or
driving records? Could the randomness of the officers' actions violate
due process or equal protection? Is a surreptitious search of records at
the unbridled discretion of police any less intrusive or offensive than a
random stop? Is there a constitutional difference? The Barnes court
did not concern itself with the nature of the random computer search.
This Article will.
First, this Article discusses the nature of the random computer
search." As part of this discussion, this Article describes the Barnes
holding and critically examines the practical consequences of the
decision.' 2 This Article determines that Barnes violates a number of
constitutional protections. 3 Finally, this Article concludes that, in this
computer age, the judicial branch must prevent the arbitrary and
capricious acts that can easily result from the random computer
searches permitted under Barnes.4
II. DISCUSSION: THE RANDOM STOP
A. The Barnes Stop
A seventy-year-old widow, charged with operating a motor vehicle
on a suspended driver's license, approaches the bench shaking and
crying. She pleads, "Your Honor, I am so sorry, I didn't know my
license was suspended... I am all by myself.., please don't send
me to jail." The judge, not seeing an underlying charge to the
suspended license, asks why the woman was stopped. The prosecutor
states, "Judge, this was a 'Barnes stop,' but the certified copy of the
abstract ' now
reveals that the driver's license is valid. Motion state
5
S.O.L."'

1I.

See infra Part I.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part 1I1.B-D.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. "S.O.L." is an abbreviation for "stricken off call with leave to reinstate." The
term is peculiar to the high-volume courts of Cook County, Illinois. It is used in place
of the more familiar Nolle Prosse order as a matter of expedience. If a criminal
complaint is "Nolle Prossed," it must be refiled as a new complaint within the applicable
statute of limitations for the particular offense. However, if a complaint is "S.O.L.d,"
the prosecutor has leave to reinstate the same complaint upon notice and motion during
the speedy trial term.
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The "Barnes stop" of which the prosecutor refers was created in
People v. Barnes.16 In Barnes, a police officer was on routine patrol
and did a random computer check on the validity of a vehicle's
registration.17 The registration was valid, but the computer check
revealed that the owner of the vehicle had a suspended driver's
license.' 8 Discovering the suspended license, the police officer
stopped the car, which was driven by Barnes.' 9 The court reasoned
that this stop was consistent with Delaware v. Prouse' because the
actual stop had an "articulable basis amounting to reasonable suspicion
that the driver [was] unlicensed."'', The appellate court, however,
never addressed the issue of whether the random search to retrieve the
information was permissible in the first place or what the reliability of
such information might be. 2
The decision in Barnes allows police to use random computer
searches to acquire information that leads to the arrest, or possible
release without charges being filed, of motorists. 23 Every day in our
legal system there are countless examples of people who suffer the
embarrassment, fear, anxiety, and indignation of being arrested,
photographed, fingerprinted and held in custody simply as a result of
the random computer search. Some of these people have suspended
driving privileges; some are no longer suspended but the information
has not yet been updated on the computer; some never were
suspended, but computer records were in error for one reason or
another; and some are victims of lost or stolen identification used by
another without their knowledge or consent. Other times, warrants are
reported on LEADS24 or NCIC25 which have already been executed or
16. 505 N.E.2d 427 (I11.
App. 4th Dist. 1987).
17. Id. at 427.
18.

Id.

19. Id.
20. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
21. Barnes, 505 N.E.2d at 428 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661
(1979)).
22. See id. at 427-28; see also United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 647-48 (5th Cir.
1970) (holding that an examination of a vehicle identification number is not proscribed
by the Fourth Amendment).
23. Barnes, 505 N.E.2d at 427-8.
24. LEADS is an acronym for the Law Enforcement Administrative Data System, a
special computerized information system available to police agencies. LEADS can
access criminal histories, stolen vehicles, missing persons, stolen articles, orders of
protection, wanted persons, criminal histories from other jurisdictions, and vehicle
information. The Illinois Secretary of State also has access to vehicle information.
25. NCIC, or National Crime Information Center, is a federally maintained
computerized data bank designed to assist federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies in combatting crime. It collects seven types of data: (I) reports on stolen

1997]

People v. Barnes-1984 Revisited

erroneously issued but never removed or recalled from the computer
system.26 At the unbridled discretion of a police officer, many people
are subjected to random computer searches only because of the color
or shade of their skin, length of their hair, type of clothing they wear,
or a multitude of other disclosed and undisclosed reasons.
We are led to ask: What do all of these people have in common?
The answer: They are all subjected to a surreptitious and random
computer search without probable cause, reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, or any observable equipment or traffic violations. In
short, they are subject to a Barnes stop.
A recent Supreme Court decision discusses the probable cause
requirement that Barnes failed to consider. In Whren v. United
States,28 the United States Supreme Court held that the ulterior motives
of a police officer cannot invalidate police conduct. 29 However, the
Court made it abundantly clear that, notwithstanding the officer's
motives, probable cause to believe that a civil traffic violation has
occurred must still exist before a stop or search may even begin.30 The
vehicles, (2) securities, (3) boats, (4) articles, (5) license plates, (6) stolen or crimeinvolved guns, and (7) "wanteds and warrants" of persons sought on felony charges, and
their criminal histories. NCIC is currently used in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the
District of Columbia.
26. See Judith I. Rentschler, Comment, Garbage In, Gospel Out: Establishing
Probable Cause Through Computerized Criminal Information Transmittals, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 509 (1976); see also Hvorcik v. Sheahan, 847 F. Supp. 1414 (N.D. I11. 1994)
(sheriff and municipality liable for failure to maintain accurate records of traffic
warrants, which resulted in unlawful arrests); People v. Jones, 443 N.Y. 2d 298, 303-04
(1981) (the problem of outdated or inaccurate police records is not that probable cause is
lacking, but "'[r]ather, the point is that police may not rely upon incorrect or
incomplete information when they are at fault in permitting the records to remain
uncorrected."') (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND. SEIZURE § 3.5, at 636 (1st ed.
1978). But see People v. Sampson, 627 N.E.2d 772, 776 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 1994)
(acknowledging that a computer check to determine that an owner of a vehicle is
suspended is sufficient to justify a temporary stop of the vehicle to check on driver's
license).
27. See generally supra text accompanying notes 8-9 (providing information about
the use of Barnes stops in Cook County); see also Whren v. United States: Pretextual
Traffic Stops and "Driving While Black", THE CHAMPION (University of California
College of Law), March 1997; Driving While Black, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
(1997). Representative John Conyers of Michigan has introduced into Congress a bill
entitled "Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997," which would mandate a study of all stops
for routine traffic violations by law enforcement officers. H.R. 118, 105th Cong.
(1997).
28. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996); see also Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops:
United States v. Whren and the Death of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 145 (1996)
(describing the results of the Whren case).
29. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774-76.
30. In reference to Prouse, the Whren Court stated: "[tihere the police action in
question was a random traffic stop for the purpose of checking a motorist's license and
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Court in Whren noted approvingly that the "'foremost method of
enforcing traffic and vehicle safety regulations ... is acting upon
observed violations' which afford the 'quantum of individualized
suspicion' necessary to ensure that police discretion is sufficiently
constrained."'"
B. The Searchfor Infonnation
Perhaps a look at the way a search is conducted will aid
understanding of what an officer does to retrieve Barnes information.
For example, a police officer on routine patrol randomly decides to
follow a vehicle. An outwardly valid license plate number is observed
and entered into the official's Mobile Data Terminal ("MDT").32 The
officer then enters "Z-2." A screen appears displaying information
regarding the vehicle's registration, ownership, and stolen vehicle
status. Upon receiving this information, even if the officer learns that
there are no irregularities regarding the vehicle or registration, the
officer enters "Z-5" into the MDT to retrieve another screen which
exhibits information about the owner of the vehicle. If the information
reveals that the owner has a suspended driver's license, the officer
stops the vehicle without ever having observed any equipment
violation or unsafe driving. 33 Is this a search? If so, is it an
vehicle registration, a practice that . . . involves police intrusion without the probable
cause that is its traditional justification." Id. at 1776. Justice Scalia compared this
police action to inventory searches and administrative inspection cases. See id. at 1773
(explaining that the following cases do not "endors[e] the principle that ulterior
motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable
cause,": Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (explaining that "an inventory search
must not be [used as] a ruse for general rummaging in order to discover incriminating
evidence"); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (stating that there was "no
showing that the police ... acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation");
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 717 n.27 (1987) (stating that the search was likely
not "a pretext for obtaining evidence of respondent's violation of the administrative
scheme")).
31. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1776 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659
(1979) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560) (1976)). The
Whren Court concluded that the officer's observations of civil traffic violations were
sufficient objective or neutral reasons to stop the motorist, even though the officer may
have had ulterior motives, and even if he did not cite the defendant for those violations.
Id. The question is whether a reasonable officer would have been objectively motivated
to stop the car by a desire to enforce an observable traffic violation notwithstanding his
personal motives.
32. The "MDT," or Mobile Data Terminal, is the mobile police computer located in a
police vehicle.
33. The Illinois Appellate Court, in People v. Barnes, created a legal presumption
that the owner of a vehicle is the driver. 505 N.E.2d 427, 428 (II1. App. 4th Dist.
1987). See also People v. Arteaga, 655 N.E.2d 290, 291 (II1. App. 3d Dist. 1995)
(citing United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561 (10th Cir. 1994) (evidence
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unreasonable search? If not, should the computer check be allowed to
go beyond the validity of vehicle registration for purposes of making a
stop?
III. ANALYSIS
A. Search v. Seizure
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.34 Article I,
Section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 protects an individual
against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy, and
interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other
means.35 The same section of the Illinois Constitution also protects
Illinois citizens from "promiscuous government surveillance .. . or
other unreasonable intrusions into their privacy. 36
Is there a difference, then, between a "search" and a "seizure"? A
"search" compromises an individual's interest in property, as opposed
suppressed where search exceeded scope of underlying justification for stop, after
purpose of stop satisfied by discovery of valid car registration)). See also supra text
accompanying notes 8-9 (discussing local police practices in suburban Cook County).
34. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .. " Id. The amendment "was a reaction to the evils of
the general warrant in England," under which customs officials were given blanket
authority to conduct general searches, and the amendment "was intended to protect
against invasions of . . . 'the privacies of life."' Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630

(1886).
35. See ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (1970). This section expanded the individual rights
which were contained in Art. II, § 6 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution and the guarantees
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. The
protection from invasion of privacy was first introduced in 1970. The Bill of Rights
Committee report to section six states:
It is probably also inevitable that infringements on individual privacy will
increase as our society becomes more complex. . . as technological
developments offer additional or more effective means by which privacy can
be invaded. In the face of these conditions the Committee concluded that it
was essential to the dignity and well being of the individual that every person
be guaranteed a zone of privacy in which his thoughts and highly personal
behavior were not subject to disclosure or review. The new provision creates a
direct right to freedom from such invasions of privacy by government or
public officials.
Committee on Bill of Rights, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention Proposal § 6
(1970)).
App. Ist Dist. 1974)
36. See generally People v. Porcelli, 323 N.E.2d 1, 4 (I11.
(reasoning that a statute that criminalizes eavesdropping comports with Article I, § 6, of
the Illinois Constitution).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 28

to a "seizure," which "deprives the individual of dominion over his or
her person or property." 3 For example, a "seizure" occurs whenever
a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away; a "search" occurs when an officer makes a careful exploration.38
Thus, a "search consists of looking for or seeking out that which is
otherwise concealed from view. ' 39 It implies prying into hidden
places for that which is concealed.' It consists of a careful probing or
exploration for something that is hidden or concealed from the
searcher; it is an invasion, a quest with some sort of force, either actual
or constructive.4 Visual observations which infringe upon a person's
reasonable expectations of privacy also constitute a search in the
constitutional sense.42 The exclusionary rule applies to a search when
law enforcement agents offend the protections of the Constitution
during the execution of that search.43
A search occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.44 When an officer
inadvertently comes within plain view of a piece of evidence which is
not concealed, the officer may seize it as long as the plain view
resulted during the course of an appropriately limited search.45 This
"plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges .46
37. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).
38. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,16 (1968).
39. People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310, 316 (Colo. 1984) (citing People v. Sporleder,
666 P.2d 135, 143-44 (Colo. 1983)). See also People v. Sylvester, 253 N.E.2d 429,
430 (Iil. 1969); People v. Robinson, 240 N.E.2d 630, 632 (I11.
1968); People v. Davis,
210 N.E.2d 530, 532 (III. 1965); State v. Woodall, 241 N.E.2d 755, 757 (Ohio 1968);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1349 (6th ed. 1990).
40. See People v. Harris, 63 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1967) (search of automobile by
arresting officer proper since incident to legal arrest); People v. Brand, 390 N.E.2d 65,
67 (111.
App. 1st Dist. 1979) (evidence of suspended license quashed because officer had
no reason to believe that defendant was violating law).
41. See People v. Carroll, 299 N.E.2d 134, 139 (Ill.
App. 1st Dist. 1973).
42. See People v. Harfmann, 555 P.2d 187, 189 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).
43. See Vargas v. State, 542 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
44. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
45. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The key word here is
"inadvertent," unlike the Barnes decision in which there was an intentional search into a
concealed document which could only be opened by searching computer records. People
v. Barnes, 505 N.E.2d 427 (111.
App. 4th Dist. 1987). But see Horton v. California, 496
U.S. 128, 137-39 (1990) (holding that, while "inadvertence" may not be required for a
legitimate plain view seizure, all warrantless searches still require the necessary
probable cause).
46. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466; see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366
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The Illinois appellate court did not consider the doctrine of plain
view in Barnes as the Supreme Court once did in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire.47 Instead, Barnes held that just because a license plate is
visible, a random search for information not readily or obviously
apparent on the face of the plate is constitutionally justified.48
Although an automobile, because of its mobility, may be searched
without a warrant, an officer must still have probable cause to believe
that he will find the instrumentalities of a crime before he starts the
search. 49 Even when a person does not know he is being searched, as
when electronic surveillance is utilized and the police confine their
activity to the least intrusive means, the Supreme Court has refused to
allow a search without prior judicial approval."
Further, an
unconstitutional search cannot be justified by what it discovers.5
Random searches performed at the unbridled discretion of the police
have not been allowed to stand, except by the Barnes court and those
courts following Barnes.2
(1993) (acknowledging that the plain view doctrine cannot justify the seizure of an
object in plain view if the police lack probable cause to believe that the object is
contraband without conducting a further search, if its incriminating character is not
immediately apparent).
47. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
48. People v. Barnes, 505 N.E.2d 427 at 428 (III. App. 4th Dist. 1987).
49. Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); see also
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487 (1996) ("Our first cases establishing
the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement were based on
the automobile's ready mobility, an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a
search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear") (emphasis added);
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1985) (tracing the history of the
automobile exception); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (search
of auto held unconstitutional absent probable cause on roving border patrol); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that officers had probable cause to stop and
search an automobile illegally transporting liquor).
More recent cases provide a further justification: the individual's reduced expectation
of privacy in an automobile, owing to its pervasive regulation. Carney, 47 U.S. at 39192. "If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains
contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without
more." Id. at 393. See also Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997) (where a search
of passenger was allowed, but only "once [the] motor vehicle ha[d] been lawfully
detained for a traffic violation."); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 116 S. Ct. 2485 (1996).
50. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-59 (1967).
51. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1968).
52. See Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 591 N.E.2d 524 (II1. App. 2d Dist.
1992) (following the rationale of Barnes); People v. McKnight, 555 N.E.2d 1196 (111.
App. 3d Dist. 1990) (upholding routine spot-check of driver's license); People v.
Francis, 280 N.E.2d 49 (i11. App. 2d Dist. 1971) (pre-dating Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 659 (1979), but holding that defendant's intent alone to drive automobile did
not justify spot-check of license); see also People v. Wolf, 326 N.E.2d 766 (II1. 1975)
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To determine whether a search is unreasonable, the courts must
balance the intrusion the search affects on an individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests. 3 In Barnes, the Illinois Appellate Court held that a
legitimate governmental interest existed in the promotion of highway
safety which allowed the state to restrict driving to only those qualified
to drive.54 In Delaware v. Prouse," however, the United States
Supreme Court held that a state's interest in discretionary spot checks
as a means of ensuring the safety of its roadways does not outweigh
the resulting intrusion on an individual's privacy and security. 6 A
state is free to impose greater(not lesser) restrictions on police activity
than those the United States Supreme Court deems necessary under
federal constitutional standards." In Barnes, however, the court
imposed lesser restrictions on police activity in Illinois by allowing
random spot checks on the status of a vehicle owner's driving
privileges.
Many vehicles are stopped as a result of a random computer check.
This leads one to ask whether the psychological intrusion or stress on
the occupants of a vehicle is any less when a police officer randomly
follows a vehicle for no apparent reason (while checking the
registration), rather than when an officer randomly stops a vehicle.
(holding that the opening of car door to examine registration is a search); People v.
Brand, 390 N.E.2d 65 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1979) (evidence of suspended license
suppressed when no reasonable suspicion existed that defendant was violating the law);
People v. James, 358 N.E.2d 88 (I11.App. 2d Dist. 1976) (evidence suppressed when
officer's stop was occasioned by nothing more than "mere whim, caprice, or idle
curiosity").
In Ohio v. Bates, No. 1576, 1987 WL 15817 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1987), the court
recognized that "[w]hile random stops of vehicles without reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity may be constitutionally invalid, random computer checks of vehicle
license plates are not. One does not have any expectation of privacy in a license plate
number which is required to be openly displayed on his vehicle." Id. at *3. However,
Judge Cacioppo's dissent suggests that "there was no initial justification for checking
the license plate on the computer. This search was without foundation and purely
random." Id. at *12 (Cacioppo, J., dissenting).
But see People v. Arteaga 655 N.E.2d 290, 291 (Il1. App. 3d Dist. 1995) (suppressing
evidence of a revoked driver's license and citing United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558
(10th Cir. 1994), in which the court held that the intent of the officer cannot be to
determine if the auto has a valid registration).
53. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); People v. Piper, 427
N.E.2d 1361 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1981).
54. People v. Barnes, 505 N.E.2d 427, 428 (III. App. 4th Dist. 1987).
55. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
56. Id. at 660.
57. Id. at 663; Barnes, 505 N.E.2d at 428.
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The Prouse Court concluded that people should not be subjected to this
type of fear and anxiety on a random basis. The invasion of privacy
attendant to a random search is no less intrusive just because the victim
does not know he or she is being investigated at random. An illegal
wiretap, for instance, is no less offensive simply because the parties
do not know they are being overheard.
In the modern age, a person becomes an open book with a computer
search. Yet people should not lose their right to privacy just because
they are operating a motor vehicle with an observable state license
plate. Operating or traveling in an automobile does not strip an
individual of his reasonable expectation of privacy simply because his
automobile and its use are subject to government regulation. 8 People
are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from
their homes onto the public sidewalk. Similarly, they should not be
shorn of those same interests when they step from that sidewalk into
their automobiles.5 9
B. Privacy
In 1888, in his treatise on torts, Judge Cooley coined the phrase
"the right to be let alone."60 Two years later, Samuel D. Warren and
Louis Brandeis proposed the existence of a right of privacy. 6 '
However, it wasn't until 1949 (ironically the same year Orwell's 1984
was published) that the United States Supreme Court began to
recognize a constitutional "right of privacy" which protects the
individual against improper actions of government officers.62 Such a
constitutional right of privacy was63 in fact held to exist in the landmark
case of Griswold v. Connecticut.
What would Justice Brandeis and Samuel Warren have thought if
they knew of the ability of computers in 1997? Surely they would
have agreed that the dawning of the computer age has seriously
jeopardized the right to privacy. When the capability of modern
58. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.
59. Id. at 663.
60. THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OFTORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
61. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.
193 (1890).
62. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Edward V. Long, The Right to
Privacy, The Case Against the Government, 10 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 (1965).
63. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Supreme Court held that there is a "right
of privacy" guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Id. at 485-86; see also Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (acknowledging that "[tihe right to privacy is no
less important than any other right ... basic to a free society").
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computers is combined with the power of government in the hands of
some police officers who act arbitrarily, capriciously, and randomly in
the search for information, we truly approach the absolute quantum of
power referred to by Lord Acton. 64
The Illinois Appellate Court has addressed the issue of an
individual's right to privacy in relation to a vehicle identification
number ("VIN"). In People v. Piper,65 the Illinois Appellate Court
rejected the state's contention that one cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a VIN.' In balancing the need of the state to
search a vehicle against the possible invasion of privacy which that
particular search may entail, the Piper court recognized the "grave
danger" of potential abuse of discretion.67 The court stated that the
abuse of discretion does not disappear simply because a vehicle is
subject to state regulation which would result in numerous instances of
police-citizen contact. 68 Regulatory inspections unaccompanied by any
quantum of individualized, articulable suspicion must be undertaken
pursuant to previously specified "neutral criteria." 69
C. Standards(Neutral Criteria)
In Delaware v. Prouse,7 the United States Supreme Court
considered the fact that a patrol officer was not acting pursuant to any
standards, guidelines, or procedures pertaining to spot checks,
promulgated either by his department or the state attorney general. 7'
Upon what standards was the officer in Barnes operating? Prior to the
computer search in Barnes, did "neutral criteria" exist as to the reason
for the spot check? Prior to the spot check, were there objective,
articulable facts supporting the officer's reasonable suspicion of the
motorist being unlicensed? Absolutely not.
64. See FAMOUS QUOTATIONS 521 (John Bartlett ed., 16th ed. 1992).
65. 427 N.E.2d 1361 (II1. App. 2d Dist. 1981).
66. Id. at 1364. But see United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding
that the examination of vehicle identification number on car frame, rear axle, or door
post is not proscribed by the Fourth Amendment and does not invade any expectations
of privacy).
67. Piper, 427 N.E.2d at 1366.
68. Id.; see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976)
(recognizing the possibility of abuse of unreviewable discretion in random roving
patrol stops); Cody v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (acknowledging that
motor vehicle regulation creates greater police-citizen contact involving automobiles
than such contact in a home or office).
69. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978).
70. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
7 1. Id. at 663 (1979).
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Given the physical and psychological intrusion visited upon the
occupants of a vehicle by a random investigation and the marginal
contribution to roadway safety that may result from a system of spot
checks, courts should not justify subjecting every occupant of every
vehicle on the roads to a search and seizure at the unbridled discretion
of law enforcement officials.72 Even in Whren v. United States,"
Justice Scalia condemned random traffic stops in order to check a
motorist's license and vehicle registration. 74 The key word is random.
Rather than acting arbitrarily, a law enforcement officer must act
according to defined standards and neutral criteria.75
D. Due Process and Equal Protection
The constitutional requirement of due process exists to protect all
people and their property against the arbitrary action of any person or
authority.76 It is the principle of due process that secures an individual
from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government unrestrained
by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice.77
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
declares that no person shall be denied the "equal protection of the
laws. 7 8 This equality of right is fundamental, and the Equal
Protection Clause forbids unequal government action that arbitrarily
discriminates against some and favors others in like circumstances.79
Under an equal protection analysis, a classification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, so that all similarly situated persons shall be
treated alike.80 The threshold question in any equal protection
discussion is whether similarly situated people are being treated
dissimilarly.8 '
72. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
73. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
74. Id. at 1776; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
75. See New York v. Burger 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (holding that warrantless search of
autos for inspections are permissible if done with standards and limited discretion of
officer).
76. See Sheldon v. Hoyne, 103 N.E.2d 1021 (1913).
77. See City of Belleville v. St. Clair County TPK Co., 84 N.E.2d 1049 (1908).
78. U.S. CONT. amend. XIV.
79. See Ashcraft v. Board of Educ., 404 N.E.2d 983 (III. App. 4th Dist. 1980).
80. See Jenkins v. Wu, 468 N.E.2d 1162 (111.
1984).
81. See People v. Burton, 427 N.E.2d 625 (I11.
App. 4th Dist. 1981). In United
States v. Armstrong, 116 S.Ct. 1480 (1996), the Court stated:
Of course, a prosecutor's discretion is subject to constitutional constraints.
One of these constraints, imposed by the equal protection component of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is that the decision whether to
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The concepts of due process and equal protection cannot possibly be
reconciled with the unbridled police discretion allowed by the Barnes
Court. To comply with due process and equal protection, standards
must be set up to guide government agents. In some of the suburban
Illinois courtrooms, the abuse of these two fundamental constitutional
rights based upon arbitrary, capricious, and random computer checks
is painfully obvious. For example, the racial or ethnic make-up of the
"Barnes stop" defendants sitting in court as opposed to the racial or
ethnic make-up of the suburb's population is often strikingly
disproportionate.82 Courts should not tolerate such invidious
discrimination resulting from the use of arbitrary police power.83
Having restated the principle of prohibiting random traffic stops in
Whren, Justice Scalia went on to say that even though an officer's
motive cannot invalidate a stop based upon probable cause, the
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based upon
prosecute may not be based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion,
or other arbitrary classification. A defendant may demonstrate that the
administration of a criminal law is directed so exclusively against a particular
class of persons . . . with a mind so unequal and oppressive that the system of
prosecution amounts to a practical denial of equal protection of the law.
Id. at 1486 (citations omitted).
82. In his concurrence in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), Justice Marshall
warned of the dangers of accepting pretextual justifications for unconstitutional racebased practices. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). As he wrote
regarding race-based peremptory challenges in jury selection:
Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror,
and trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons....
"It is...
Nor is outright prevarication by prosecutors the only danger ....
possible that an attorney may lie to himself in an effort to convince himself
that his motives are legal." (quoting King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp.
493, 498 (E.D. N.Y (1984)). A prosecutor's own conscious or unconscious
racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black juror is
'sullen' or 'distant', a characterization that would not have come to his mind if
a white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious or unconscious
racism may lead him to accept such an explanation as well supported. ...
"[S]eat of the pants instincts" may often be just another term for racial
It is worth remembering that "114 years after the War between
prejudice ....
the States . . . racial and other forms of discrimination still remain a fact of
"
life ..
Id., 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
83. See People v. Harris, 63 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1967). See also State v. Chatton,
463 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (Ohio 1984). The Ohio court claimed:
To eliminate any requirement that an officer be able to explain the reasons for
his actions . . . leaves police discretion utterly without limits. Some citizens
will be subjected to this minor indignity while others-perhaps those with
more expensive cars, or different bumper stickers, or different-colored skinmay escape it entirely.
Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977)).
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considerations such as race. 4 The constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminating application of the laws is the Equal
Protection Clause.85 The arbitrary, capricious, and random computer
check allowed by the Barnes court cannot be justified under the Equal
Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause. In order to protect
citizens from the unbridled discretion practiced by some law
enforcement officers, courts must recognize violations of these clauses
when the situations present themselves.
IV. CONCLUSION
A. ControllingImproper Use
The key words in this Article are random, arbitrary, unbridled
discretion, and power. Even in the most conservative decisions, the
United States Supreme Court has consistently prohibited and
condemned such arbitrary, capricious, and unstandardized use of
government power.
While computerized information systems offer vast potential for
good, they also provide equal potential for abuse.8 6 While the
capabilities and commensurate benefits of such systems grow, the
potential for abuse grows with it. It is thankfully true that most police
officers do not abuse the authority given to them. By no means does
this Article suggest that honest law enforcement should be hampered
simply because it is aided by computers in police vehicles.
This Article does suggest, however, that the Barnes stop, as used in
Illinois courts today, is only the tip of the iceberg. We must consider
what relief is available to those who are stopped, searched, and frisked
simply because the computer shows that an owner is suspended, but
the actual driver is not. Perhaps the real owner is a passenger being
chauffeured by a friend or family member, or perhaps the owner is not
in the car, or is not suspended, or countless other reasons that show
how random spot checks lead to arbitrary stops of innocent people.
Without the arrests of these drivers, these cases would never appear in
court.
The Barnes court nevertheless came to the conclusion, albeit without
any empirical data, that the suspended owner is presumed to be the
driver of the vehicle.87 But by what degree of evidence was this
84.
85.
86.
87.

Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 (1996).
Id.
See Rentschler, supra note 26, at 531.
The court in Barnes created a legal presumption in Illinois and other jurisdictions
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conclusion reached? Should binding legal presumptions rest upon
guess work? The answer to this question is quite obvious: inferences
should not be drawn without evidence.
The judicial branch of government should always be mindful of the
consequences of its rulings. Discretion granted to government agents
should not exist without standards to control it. To allow law
enforcement officers the unbridled discretion promoted by the Barnes
court is a dangerous precedent. If we give an inch some will take a
foot.
No one, including law enforcement personnel, should be allowed
unlimited access to computer records. Otherwise, where does the
search stop? If an officer could get on-line with a credit history,
medical history, marital status, or other personal records, would that
intrusion be allowed? Perhaps the next step should be to walk around
with "license plates" attached to our backs so that all of our individual
movement could be regulated. Pursuant to a system of arbitrary,
standardless, and random spot checks, such an unspeakable result
could occur.
B. The Futureof Random Computer Searches
The United States and Illinois Supreme Courts have not yet ruled
precisely on the issue of random computer searches as a basis for
stopping a vehicle. When that time comes, however, the proscriptions
of Prouse should be carefully studied and followed. Conversely, the
ruling in Barnes should be reconsidered.
As Justice Thomas Clark once lamented in Mapp v. Ohio:
"[n]othing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the Charter of its own
existence., 88 Court-imposed sanctions, such as the exclusionary
rule, 89 exist to protect innocent persons from unconstitutional
that the owner of a vehicle is generally the driver. There was no expert opinion, data or
even a scintilla of evidence supporting the conclusion. The conclusion is pure
conjecture and certainly cannot qualify as judicial notice. See People v. Rhoden, 625
N.E.2d 940, 945 (I1. App. 4th Dist. 1993) (creating an inference that the owner is the
driver); Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 591 N.E.2d 524, 525 (111.
App. 2d Dist.
1992) (citing Barnes, and concluding that there is a "reasonable inference" that a
vehicle's owner is the one driving the vehicle); People v. Jendrzejak, 240 N.E.2d 239,
242 (II1. App. 1st Dist. 1968) (recognizing a presumption in civil cases that the owner
of a vehicle is the driver); Robinson v. Workman, 137 N.E.2d 804, 808 (I11.
App. 4th
Dist. 1956).
88. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
89. "The purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effective available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." Id. at 656
(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
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invasions of their rights and liberty, not to protect criminals or hamper
law enforcement. Computer information is a valuable weapon for
effective law enforcement and the fight against crime. 9° It is necessary
in this modem technical age for law enforcement officers to have such
an important weapon, and it is certainly not the intent of this Article to
eliminate such an effective means of tracing criminals and their
whereabouts. The purpose of this Article is simply to suggest that
pursuant to the Supreme Court's ruling in Delaware v. Prouse, the
Illinois General Assembly, the Illinois Attorney General, or, if
necessary, the state courts should promulgate standards relating to the
subjective use of computer information. Such standards would be
fashioned to safeguard due process and equal protection under the law,
so that innocent persons are protected from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
To allow computer searches without requiring clear standards or
neutral criteria is to allow a subtle cancer of power to grow beneath the
surface of a person's right to privacy and invade his freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures. It would perpetuate invidious
discrimination to the worst degree. This discrimination we cannot
allow.
The Supreme Court prohibited this very evil of standardless and
unconstrained police discretion in Delaware v. Prouse,9" AlmeidaSanchez v. United States,92 and Camara v. Municipal Court.93 The
Court has always insisted that the discretion of officers in the field be
circumscribed, at least to some extent. Referring to an individual's
basic rights of privacy secured by the Due Process Clause, the
Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio stated:
[W]e can no longer permit [the right to privacy] to be revocable
at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our
decision, founded on reason and truth gives to the individual no
more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the
police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement
is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary
in the true administration of justice.94

90. See Rentschler, supra note 26, at 512 (recognizing the importance of the
computer web in apprehending a criminal and retrieving property).
91. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).

92. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
93. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
94. 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
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If we on the bench allow random stops, searches, or seizures to
continue at the whim of police officers through the unconstrained use
of computers, we will be well on our way to revisiting Orwell's
1984-only this time it won't be in a novel.

